notes for 2006.02.08

introductory class!

seminar style:
1st half: discussion
2nd half: introduction to new material

intro:
theoretical framework of online communication
medium is gateway for information
similar to architecture -- the space shapes your experience, affects you, changing your perceptions

mapping biological theory of signaling theory to communication
understanding and applying the models across the boundaries

how do we perceive each other in different spaces?

design spaces for online behaviour

signaling : economic way of studying communication
costs, benefits of sender and receiver of signals, to be honest, to be skeptical, etc

what is the difference between social (membership of groups, how do groups form boundaries, hierarchies) and personal identity?
read little bits of information --> rendering mental representation of a person

signaling exists in a world of 'competition'
need to distinguish oneself from others

handicap principle -- wasting energy to show that you are ever the more stronger

everyday conversation competition - authoritative, knowledge.
motivation to behave in certain ways, presenting yourself in a way, a public 'persona'
fashion of ideas -- knowledge-based hierarchy

diego gambetta - streetwise: how taxi drivers choose which fare to pick up
http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0871543087/102-0196640-9564952?v=glance&n=283155

reputation systems -- recognisable identity online
what are costs / benefits to making people at some ways identifiable?
gossip (effusive) vs. reputation systems (less exciting)

how to punish transgressors (liars, dishonest signaling) effectively?

gifting systems

faces, what are emotions? what do faces reveal and not reveal

designing systems on how to represent people

reading assignments + short essay / design problem

final: long paper OR design project
spec out the design and workings

assignments are online. post them to a link + upload your URL.
open-discuss list, or blog . -- class members to discuss.

veblen: theory of the leisure class.
to have statement reliable, should be wasteful of resource in domain
- display wealth in a wasteful fashion
- like gazelle waste energy
- how do you display leisure?? it's hard to display instantaneous.
- examples: time-wasting activities --> knowing latin, growing orchids, breeding dogs
be able to waste resources and display the waste

zahavi : handicap principle :
http://octavia.zoology.washington.edu/handicap/handicap_principle.html
--> to display quality honestly, show it wastefully

qualities : things that are hidden that you want to know
signals: perceivable representation of underlying qualities

signals can be honest (indicates a quality that is true) or dishonest (indicates a quality that is not true)
signals can be reliable ((almost) always be honest) or unreliable (ambiguously credible)

stable: society can accept rates of honesty/dishonesty
unstable: rate of dishonesty is too high

signaller + receiver == two parts of system
truths:
- a system will exist if it is more beneficial for signaller to signal honestly
- more beneficial than not for the receiver to get honest signals
- signals are more honest if more costly to signal dishonestly

cues vs. signals
cues: anything that you use to observe the world
ex. mosquito finds you through CO2. a cue to your presence.
signals: deliberate purpose to indicate a hidden quality

these can overlap, ambiguous boundaries
ex. wearing a fur coat signals wealth/status; serves as unintentional cue as person as animal-killer.

purpose of signal must be to communicate
receiver gets cues whether or not they're deliberate

handicap signals: signaling through waste (i.e. huge antlers, conducting leisure activities)

assessment signals:
costly to dishonestly signal highly reliable.

index signals (semiotics, charles pierce): some inherent connection to the quality being signaled.
index signals are not costly (i.e. tiger is big enough to scratch higher up on the tree) if you're honest.
index signals are extremely costly if not impossible if you're dishonest. hard to fake.

humans are clever to fake or create dishonest signals.
if benefit is high enough, motivation to dishonestly signal (i.e. rent expensive car, get a fake tan)
circumventions -- propelled by ability to invent vs. ability to pick out dishonesty

conventional signals: signal + quality relationship established by convention
no addition cost for physically producing signal (i.e. slapping on a bumper sticker)
kept honest if level of competition is low (i.e. child on honor roll)
kept honest by punishment costs --- societal repersussion to dishonest signals
-- putting on a siren to get through traffic -- the risk/cost of getting caught doesnt make it worth it

sparrows grow badges on chest to indicate status
- the lowstatus ones 'disguised' as highstatus was, initially accepted, but when they were discovered, and were attacked

brightness is a handicap - higher risk for predation
butterflies -- mimicry.
mimics: (batesian) looking like a poisonous through colouration.
makes world more dangerous for the actual, fit butterflies.
mullerian mimics: collaborative reinforcement of signal
http://dorakmt.tripod.com/evolution/mimicry.html

signaller:

personal benefit by changing the perception of people reading my signals
beneficial in itself (having an expensive car is costly but you at least enjoy the car)
balance of benefits : signaling + nonsignaling

cost in producing signal (time, energy, money) (i.e. spending years getting ph.d. vs. buying a bumper sticker)
cost of dishonesty / punishment.

receiver:

some benefit when the signal is perceived, can learn something about the signaller

costs of assessing the signal may be high (cost of time, energy)
music concert: longer you listen the cost of time/boredom/opportunity cost
frogs mating croaks: longer you go, you may attract predators
or cost of obtaining knowledge to properly assess signal -- how do you evaluate?
-- can be informed to tell if this person is being honest (i.e. jobtalk, admissions)

punishment:
- possible to circumvent way to pay full cost to give impression of signal
- want to punish dishonest signals
- what motivates altruistic punishment? social cooperation with assumed altruism (idealistic model)
neuroscience / psychology -- carrying out punishment can be costly as well as beneficial (stimulate reward-part of brain)
willingness to take risks <-- stable --> reward to punish
- cost and benefit to policing behaviour, gauging motivations

dynamics of a system constantly changing over time -- change of environment, people, beliefs

--> art of interpretation
shape an interpretation that makes sense.

subjectivity ---> how do you learn to make better and better assumptions about people?
'honesty' is always up to interpretation.

signal to increase level of valid knowledge of receiver
(1) signal has to be honest
(2) signal has to be understood
(3) signal has to be believed

(incorrect knowledge is a change for the worst).

next time: evaluating social status, hierarchy. cultural role. social groups. boundaries of knowledge.
signal efficacy. strategic costs vs efficacy costs (just getting signal across).

have assignments posted by the preceding tuesday of class. and read other people's postings, too!

and come with questions and topic points for class discussion. it'll be fun!